Andrew A. Gooley
Macquarie University
This article details some issues I faced when trying to re-establish my core facility following a laboratory fire and offers suggestions based on this experience.
During the 1994 Christmas week in Sydney, Australia we had an extremely hot day, 47 degreesC (117 degreesF), the hottest day in forty years. Our campus is only thirty years old, so our laboratories had never been exposed to these conditions. A fire started in a non-air conditioned laboratory, adjacent to our air conditioned core facility, following a short circuit in a general power outlet that sparked nearby ether vapors. A ventilated solvent cupboard of chlorinated hydrocarbons started to burn and finally exploded (it remains unclear what actually exploded!). Because the fire was originally contained inside the solvent cupboard, automatic alarms were not tripped; eventually an alarm was tripped manually by laboratory personnel. The flame caused minimal local damage, and the water used by the fire department caused some localized damage to the floor below. However, the flame did burn a hole in the ceiling panels that allowed a thick chlorinated hydrocarbon smoke to spread quickly through two laboratories via the ceiling void.
In our laboratory, the excessive level of soot over all the equipment, benches, and even in closed drawers was very disheartening. Any equipment that could be energized acted like a magnet and was both covered and impregnated with soot, even if it was not in use during the fire. Fan cooled equipment was extensively contaminated. In such a situation, the first action of the core facility manager is to assume responsibility and establish communication with the laboratory or department manager and the campus or company resident buildings and grounds supervisor. Do not assume that these people have your facility's interest at heart and insist that you meet with them and that you are included in any meetings regarding the re-establishment of the facility.
Your insurance agent will likely appoint a loss inspector who will contact engineers experienced in assessing the level of contamination. Arrange a meeting with these parties as soon as possible. While your instinct may suggest that the immediate action of laboratory staff is to wipe surfaces clean, it is crucial to minimize movement in the affected areas. Removal of surface contamination will only delay the assessment. The soot of laboratory fires typically contains hydrogen chloride. As core facility manager you should interview all laboratory personnel and if the fire started in your laboratory, find out what probably burned (solvents, plastics like polyvinyl chloride, etc.) and what equipment was in use during the fire. In our fire, all the staff knew that chlorinated hydrocarbons had burned, but we all failed to tell the restoration engineer. This would have made his assessment far easier and more effective. The restoration engineers assess the contamination and advise on what immediate action is necessary. When entering the damaged facility keep shutdown procedures to a minimum. Remove chemicals from synthesizers and sequencers but do not energize the equipment. Do not start any cleaning--washing equipment only adds to the humidity and can accelerate corrosion of metals (in particular integrated circuit boards). In humid environments it is likely that all equipment will be removed to a controlled low humidity atmosphere, or dehumidifiers will be installed for large equipment that cannot be shifted. This action is necessary and should be immediate. Even if you think some equipment is damaged beyond repair, it must be removed to a controlled environment until the loss adjuster has made a decision on the repair or replacement cost.
It may come as a surprise that it is now possible to decontaminate fire, water, or chemical damaged equipment. Your insurance agent may be attracted to this possibility as the decontamination cost can be significantly less than the replacement cost. It is possible to clean everything but not by simply wiping it down with a damp cloth. The process involves complete dismantling of the contaminated equipment and the cleaning of individual components. Each component is then tested again for contamination before final reassembly. Once each decontaminated item is tested for obvious functions by the restoration engineers, the instrument manufacturers' service engineers can be called to recommission the instruments.
Recommissioning the laboratory and instrumentation is a frustrating and time-consuming experience. The laboratory must be completely decontaminated prior to installation and temporary laboratory space may be needed to accommodate decontaminated equipment. My advice is to insist that the service engineers recommission the instruments at the restoration engineer's site before installation at your own site. Major electronic faults can usually be repaired by the restoration engineers. However, you must be prepared to act as liaison between the service engineer and the restoration engineer, as communication often breaks down over who is responsible for particular faults. All recommissioning costs should be covered by the loss adjuster. You should ensure that this occurs because these costs are very expensive.
It is now one year after the fire, and 90% of the facility is operational. Within three months we had the high-demand instrumentation (amino acid analyzer, protein sequencer, carbohydrate analyzer, HPLCs) recommissioned. However, problems remain with several instruments that were operational before the fire but have not been recommissioned due to the lack of spare parts or continuing electronic faults.
In summary, I have several recommendations if other core facilities are faced with a similar disaster:
* Consult with your loss adjuster and company concerning the appointment of a member of the core facility staff to oversee the re-establishment of the facility. This appointment would be for about three months and would be full-time. The loss adjuster will cover this salary.
* Ensure a smooth re-establishment of laboratory operation by early liaison with local regulatory authorities (e.g., fire department, health department) that may have jurisdiction in your community. Maintain good communication with the restoration engineers and the instrument service engineers. Insist that the packaging and shipment of the repaired major instrumentation is done by the manufacturer and not the restoration company. This is crucial to eliminate disputes over damage during transport.
* Explore the possibility of repairs and minor works on the facility during the restoration.
It may seem illogical but most insurance policies allow repair but not correction of the problems that caused the fire. During restoration, our facility was completely emptied, so the decontamination and re-establishment process was easier. In our building the entire ceiling and roof was removed to clean all cables and ducting in the ceiling void. This provided an ideal opportunity to install an extension of the air-conditioning into the laboratory where the fire started. However, bureaucracy prohibited the restoration contractors from installing extensions to the ducting in order to prevent the possibility of another fire due to summer temperature extremes. In some jurisdictions of the United States, agencies stipulate clearance procedures (such as air sampling) or changes before authorizing re-occupancy.
Of course prevention is the best way to avoid a fire. Know the physical properties of all chemicals in your facility--a Material Safety Data Sheet is one common source of information. Ensure that all chemicals are stored and used appropriately, e.g., do not store chemicals beyond their safe shelf life, store chemicals according to chemical compatibility, separate oxidizing agents from flammable chemicals, use flammable storage cabinets with their own fire suppression system if warranted, maintain the smallest chemical stocks that are still practical, and have adequate ventilation to minimize explosion and fire.
I believe under the extreme temperature conditions we experienced at Christmas 1994 we should have closed the laboratory, shutdown all the electrical equipment, and called the fire brigade to secure the area and declare it safe. It was dangerous to have staff in a building where the temperature 30 cm from the ceiling void was 55 degreesC (131 degreesF)! This now sounds like common sense but no one was in a position to assume responsibility and take this action. I recommend that you discuss with your safety officers plans and draft procedures for potential weather-related extremes.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank the reviewers of this article for their comments, some of which are included to broaden the recommendations for laboratory safety and fire prevention.
The author may be contacted at Macquarie University, Center for Analytical Biotechnology, Sydney NSW, Australia 2109.
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